Accountability and Free Will

We demand free will for the accountability that we held accountable for the decisions made by us, no matter how good or bad the outcomes of the decisions. This conception mainly relies on one important principle:

A person is morally responsible for his decision only if he could have done otherwise (that there is no coercion). 

One may interpret in this way: if free will is absent, which entails that everyone is coerced to make their decisions, then everyone is not accountable for their decisions made for the sake of the absence of the possibility of doing otherwise.

But wait a minute. It seems to me that the overwhelming force of the absence of free will deters us from thinking that our decisions made could be actually entailed by the desires, reasons or mentality of us if free will is present.

Therefore, my question is the following:

If the mentality of us (that how we think about the action, whether it is better to do it or not) is already a sufficient condition for the happening of the action, meanwhile determinism is present (that we are pre-determined to do the actions that are predetermined

to be done by us), are we accountable for the actions done?

For example, you have sufficient reasons to study hard (A) and you are pre-determined to study hard (B) before an exam. It turns out that you got a high score from your studying hard. A and B are each a sufficient condition for the high score you got resulted from your studying hard. Are we accountable for our success (if getting high score counts as a success)?

Let's see one more example. You have sufficient reasons to play around (A) and you are pre-determined to play around. It turns out that you got a low score from your playing around. Are we accountable for our failure?

I would say this: we are still accountable for our failure or success if the coercion (the force of determinism) is not against us, but rather on our side, compatible with our reasons which are already a sufficient cause of the action. Indeed it is weird to call this uncontrollable force as a coercion when it is on our side. Put it in another way, if a person does his action or make his decision without any regard to the uncontrollable force of determinism, he is still accountable for the act done or decision made, in a full extent. This helps explain why some philosophers are satisfied with compatibilism, for that moral accountability can be retained even if we give up on the orthodox free will. But minded that if our desires reasons are also determined, we are still not accountable for what we have done, even if we ourselves wanted to.